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have been advanced by Droysen, Erdmannsdörfer, and the other predecessors. On the whole, it is but a single novel thesis which is put forward by the author, and that thesis he may be said to have substantiated. Frederick William, we now know, did not attempt to unite the Protestant churches, as is commonly supposed in Prussia, but only aspired to win them both over to accept his great state principle of tolerance. And as a sort of corollary the author establishes the conclusion that if the elector met with difficulties in this course it is not alone the fault of the Lutherans, but also, and in far greater degree than has commonly been supposed, of the Calvinist denomination.

In spite of the remoteness of much of the matter discussed in this book, it is remarkably easy reading. One may say of it that it is fairly free from volubility, and that it is pervaded by a keen sense of order; praise which can only rarely be accorded German historical books. It should also be noted as worthy of consideration that the author, although dealing with highly specialized matter, never loses from sight the larger political points of view, and so succeeds in giving a very just estimate of Frederick William's share in the Peace of Westphalia and of the importance of his assumption of the evangelical leadership in Germany.

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MORAL EVOLUTION. By GEORGE HARRIS, Professor in Andover Theological Seminary. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., The Riverside Press, Cambridge, 1896. Pp. ix + 446. \$2.

IN this book Dr. Harris has made a new and valuable addition to the doctrine of evolution, and has at the same time done much to show that this doctrine is consistent with ethics and theology. Since evolution is as far reaching in time as gravitation is in space, it becomes important to conceive of it in such fashion as not to exclude, but to include, those moral and spiritual elements which constitute the real significance of the universe. But the waste and pain of the animal creation, the beasts red in tooth and claw with ravin, the struggle for life, the hecatombs of victims, have seemed difficult to reconcile with benevolence or morals. It is a great gain to learn that even the ante-human life of the world has in it the germs of ethics and of goodness.

Professor Drummond, in his *Ascent of Man*, gave the first step of

the demonstration. He showed that there is a certain altruism in the brute creation. Reproduction is a giving out as well as a taking in, and care for offspring is not self-regarding, but self-sacrificing. All along the line of upward development there was not only struggle for life, but also struggle for the life of others. In every lion's den and tiger's lair there were the beginnings of sympathy and helpfulness, adumbrations of the moral life that was to come. Evolution of animal life, though not itself moral, was, at least in this one respect, preparing the way for morality in man. So Professor Drummond disclosed a thread of connection between the earlier and the later history of the planet, and pointed out that "through the ages one increasing purpose runs."

But Professor Drummond's justification of the evolutionary process left much to be desired. It showed at most an occasional and partial mitigation of what seemed on the whole to be warfare and cruelty, devastation and slaughter. It is the great merit of Dr. Harris that he has discovered another genuine preparation for morality in the world's prehistoric life. It has occurred to him that altruism is not the whole of morality; that self-preservation, self-assertion, self-perfection are just as important to ethics as self-surrender, self-abnegation, self-sacrifice. Self-love is just as much a duty as love to our neighbor,—in fact, we are commanded only to love our neighbor as ourself. This is not only a divine law, but a rational law; for unless we take care of self we shall have nothing to give to others; and we cannot rightly give to others anything that involves moral loss or harm to ourselves. For the very sake of others, then, I am bound to make the most of myself. Self-defense, self-maintenance, self-perfection are not only duties,—they are the very law of being, and no morality can exist without them.

In the light of this principle, much that before seemed not only unmoral but contrary to morality, in the evolution of life, now falls into line as a natural preliminary to man's self-realization. The very struggle for life has an incipient moral significance, or at least it has in it a germ of good which will in time develop into self-perfecting moral effort. Life is a good, and it is right for the animal to preserve it. Since self-preservation is a prerequisite to self-realization, it is not antagonistic to altruism, nor done away by it. Self has its own claims, and these must be satisfied. And much of the evil look of evolution disappears, or is mitigated, when this principle is recognized. Of a hundred blossoms one survives: but the ninety-and-nine fertilize the

soil and enable the survivor to ripen. The young lions roar and seek their prey from God : God provides the prey, even, as he provides animal food for man.

But does Dr. Harris explain the failure to realize themselves on the part of the ninety-nine blossoms that did not survive, or on the part of the sheep that the lion slew ? Our author does not claim to have constructed a complete theodicy. He has justified the survivor, but it is more difficult for him to justify the fate of those who do not survive. He shows indeed that strife, waste, and pain are merely incidents, but are not the law, of progress. There might be a progress without them, —at least we can conceive of a progress in which each should take only what the other freely gave. He points out that self-preservation, becoming self-realization, tends to eliminate strife and suffering, and to correct its own defects. But why the defects ? Much as we praise the positive merits of Dr. Harris' treatment, and gladly as we acknowledge the new point of contact which he has shown between evolution and ethics, we must regard his solution of the problem as incomplete, both because of an overestimate of what is meant by evolution, and an underestimate of what is meant by ethics.

Evolution is only a method, and nature is but a means, while the agent is God. The idealistic view of the world which regards matter as the constant manifestation of mind and will leaves the universe subject to plan and plastic in God's hands. Just as the stone foundation of the house may be the designed preparation for the brick superstructure, while yet with the superstructure there enter in new methods and laws, so animal life may be the basis of human life, yet fail to explain it. With Lotze we would hold to continual divine reinforcements of the evolutionary process, rather than to a fixed *quantum* of energy ; yet, with Lotze, we believe that these increments of power, once appearing, become inseparable parts of the great whole. And what is true of God is in a limited measure true of man. Man's will can enter into nature and can change and add ; though these effects, once appearing, are never again lost. Hence we can believe in miracle, not as an interference from without, but as the working of the immanent God from within. To him who believes in a God of whose mind and will nature is but an expression, there is no inconsistency between evolution and miracle, for miracle is only a unique and forward step in evolution, when the fullness of time has come, a forward step which cannot be explained as an outcome of the past, but which is accomplished by a new impulse of the God whose regular action made that past what it is.

There is another conception of evolution. It intends to be Christian. It speaks of evolution as God's method. But it falls in with the current view of nature as a second absolute, a closed circle, sufficient to itself. It seems to us that Dr. Harris concedes too much to this tendency of thought. Though he does not intend it, his book shows that mechanical views still have hold upon him. There is a general disposition to eliminate the miraculous, and to substitute the operation of natural law. For example, he grants man's rise from savagery, the evolution of the monogamic family from polygamy, the development of the moral sentiments from the instincts of animals, the blossoming of polytheism into monotheism. Though Christ's virgin birth is consonant with his transcendent origin and work, Dr. Harris does not regard it as essential to Christianity. And, although his expressions are somewhat vague with regard to Christ's resurrection, we gather that he attaches greater importance to Christ's life after death and to some sort of spiritual appearance to the disciples than he does to a literal physical coming forth from the tomb.

We regard all these concessions not only as unrequired by a proper view of evolution, but as inconsistent with the historical trustworthiness of Scripture. Moreover, they seem to us to endanger the very ethics for which Dr. Harris is seeking to lay a foundation. For the basis of ethics is the self. The terms which occur so frequently—self-regarding, self-perfecting, self-realizing—are without meaning unless they imply freedom. Freedom does not run in a rut. It involves the possibility of new beginnings. It is capable of unique and exceptional, as well as of regular and automatic, action. Our author grants this in the case of sin. He grants that there is such a thing as degeneration. This reverses the evolutionary process. The loss and destruction that are contrary to virtue are the results, not of the original law of man's being, but of a self-perversion which consists in abnormal exaggeration of the principle of self-love. But virtue is equally the product of freedom, and if man is made in the image of God, God as well as man must be free. The naturalistic view of evolution which treats all miracle with suspicion, if not with denial, is in danger of cutting away the very foundation of ethics by practically ignoring the freedom of both God and man.

Andover has hitherto been a synonym for the doctrine of free will. But it has also been a synonym for the doctrine of disinterested benevolence as the essence of virtue, and of love as the fundamental attribute of God. It is significant of a widening horizon when Dr. Harris

proposes to make self-love, as well as altruism, essential to virtue, and declares that "self-love is not derived from love to others, but love to others gets its pattern and therefore its measure from love to self." Here is an admission of great consequence to a correct theology. It seems to grant the contention of the older and more rigid systems that in God the self-affirming, self-maintaining, self-asserting attribute, which we call holiness, must be logically prior to the self-imparting, self-communicating, self-sacrificing attribute, which we call love. Dr. Harris, it is true, defines holiness as "wholeness," in a way which seems to us to ignore the definite biblical descriptions of it as purity contrasted with sin; and he tries to include self-love in love, so as to make self-assertion a form of self-impartation, both of which we consider unjustifiable, although necessary to the vindication of the Andover theology. The fact still remains, that we have in this book, in spite of its too great concessions to a naturalistic view of evolution, an approximation to the old-fashioned scriptural view that God's interests are supreme, that he finds his ultimate end in himself, and that holiness and not love is the fundamental attribute of his nature.

If Dr. Harris would grant this formally and fully, rather than impliedly and inferentially, light would be thrown upon matters which his book has left obscure. The necessity of an atonement would be apparent, and it would be plain that, in the redemption of man, God, and not simply man, must be reconciled. If the waywardness of a son may cause grief to an earthly father's heart, and the demand of righteousness that he be expelled from the household may come into grievous conflict with the pleadings of fatherly affection, why should we deny that man's sin brings God's pity into such conflict with God's holiness that only the Lamb slain from before the foundation of the world can reconcile them? And if God's antagonism to sin is justly displayed in judgment, and in the infliction of suffering since man appeared, why should we hesitate to believe that the prehistoric pain and waste and death were congruous incidents and preparations of the great moral drama that was to be enacted upon earth? The problem of physical evil can never be disconnected from the problem of moral evil, and neither of these problems can find its solution apart from a thoroughgoing acknowledgment of the holiness of God and the sin of man. We can hold to moral evolution only as we emphasize the word moral quite as much as we emphasize the word evolution. Much as we admire Dr. Harris' book, it seems to us to lay greater emphasis upon the physical aspect of evolution than upon its moral aspect.

Though the virgin birth is not regarded as essential to Christianity, we can highly commend the new proof which Dr. Harris has given that evolution is perfectly consistent with the supreme and unique position of Jesus Christ as spiritual head of the race. Evolution has in all probability brought forth all the myriads of human beings from a single human ancestor—a fact *a priori* difficult to predict, and, considering the immense number of chance variations which had at favorable times to be taken advantage of, almost incredible. But if it is consistent with evolution that the physical and natural life of the race should be derived from a single source, then it is equally consistent with evolution that the moral and spiritual life of the race should be derived from a single source; and Scripture is stating only scientific fact when it sets the second Adam over against the first Adam, as the head of redeemed humanity, the only name given under heaven among men whereby we can be saved. We have put the thought of our author in other words than his, but we fully agree with the substance of it, and we esteem it as still another valuable contribution to the reconciliation of evolution and ethics.

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DIE URCHRISTLICHEN TRADITIONEN ÜBER URSPRUNG UND SINN DES ABENDMAHLS. ZUR GESCHICHTE DES URCHRISTENTUMS. VON FRIEDRICH SPITTA. Erster Band. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1893.

Professor Spitta's essay on the Eucharist has excited much attention in theological circles in Germany, and is both strikingly original and full of valuable suggestions. Some remarks on it will be found in Grafe's lecture on recent theories as to the Eucharist in the *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, zweites Heft, 1895, pp. 101-139.

Spitta confesses at the outset that he has been led to abandon his earlier views on the subject, expressed in his treatise "On the Reform of Evangelical Worship." The true key to the understanding of the real meaning of the last supper is to be found, he thinks, in the words of institution, which, as Keim rightly remarks, form one of the most certain parts of the tradition of the life of Christ. Spitta indeed holds that St. Paul's version of the words is not so trustworthy as that contained in the synoptics. He is of opinion that the original tradition might have received accretions during a period of twenty years, such as elapsed before St. Paul wrote. Here I cannot agree with him,